Hurricane Andrew Changed It All
In August 1992, Hurricane Andrew caused an unprecedented level of destruction . With insured losses of more than $18 billion and total losses greater than $25 billion, Andrew was the most devastating natural catastrophe ever recorded . It has also led to a wave of financial catastrophe: the hurricane affected almost every major insurance company in the United States . No matter how hard reinsurers tried to diversify their portfolios among different insurance companies, they sustained losses on virtually every account that they had underwritten .
Reinsurers Depart
The magnitude of these losses contributed to the demise of numerous reinsurers . In the year following Andrew, 38 non-U.S . and 8 than 30 percent between 1989 and 1993-over 20 percent of which occurred between 1992 and 1993 and was due to Hurricane Andrew. In 1989, the average U.S . catastrophe reinsurance program was -approximately $144.3 million . But by January 1993, immediately after Andrew, the average program capacity had plummeted to $93 .7 million. Insurance companies could not buy enough catastrophe reinsurance-no matter how much they were willing to pay. The worldwide catastrophe reinsurance demand exceeded the supply. This is illustrated by Figure 1 . Composite of 14 programs placed by Guy Carpenter 8c Co., Inc .
'Shortfall is the difference between the amount of coverage desired and the amount of coverage available in the market .
Prices Rise
Between 1989 and 1994, the contraction of capacity caused reinsurance prices to rise al- In recent years, the increase in weather volatility has heightened the difficulty in predicting catastrophic property losses, rendering standard actuarial tables unreliable. Such climate volatility is often associated with global climate change . This is blamed by some on the emission of greenhouse gases into the planet's atmosphere by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, the group of the world's most industrialized nations . If so, volatility is only going to increase . The problem is not likely to go away.
As climate becomes more volatile, actuarial tables have become unreliable, creating the risk of using the wrong table for predictive purposes. For example, one table could predict five hurricanes over a 5-year period, with average strength and associated loss of $3 billion each. Another, equally reliable, table could predict 10 hurricanes during the same period, having losses of about $2 billion each.
Although one can take an average of the two source's opinions in creating a new actuarial table, this does not work in actual practice . If both scenarios are equally plausible, for example, then taking the average guarantees that, most of the time, the exposure to risks will either be overinsured or underinsured. Both lead to costly risks . The former leads to financial losses since insurance is expensive. Underinsurance is even more costly ; underinsurance leads to financial risks of default . In continued on page 5 
Inapplicability of the Law of Large Numbers
The second problem associated with predicting the incidence of catastrophic property loss is that insurance does not work very well under these circumstances. The law of large numbers requires that risks be "independent," behaving, for example, as car accidents or fire hazards . These conditions produce reliable actuarial tables, which form the scientific foundation for pricing in the insurance industry. However, when large-scale catastrophic property losses occur, risks are no longer independent because a hurricane affecting one insurer will also affect every other insurer writing coverage in the same geographical area .
In effect, catastrophic property losses are highly correlated risks-as opposed to being independent risks . And since large-scale property catastrophes impact a significant_ part of the insurer population both in physical and in financial terms, the law of large numbers does not operate under these circumstances, making it impossible for reinsurers to diversify risks . What can be done?
Catastrophe Bundles: A Tool for Hedging Risks In response to this problem, the insurance industry has begun to adopt innovative solutions. Reinsurers can deal with the correlated risks posed by property catastrophes using a 'catastrophe bundle," 2 introduced at the program on 2See A.M. Bests's Review, March 1996, p. 45 . Information and Resources at Columbia University (copyright 1995). A catastrophe bundle is a two-part contract which combines a catastrophe future with a mutual reinsurance portfolio. Catastrophe bundles permit reinsurers to provide full, customized coverage to an insurer without having it assume unreasonable risk.
Catastrophe Futures
The first component of a catastrophe bundle treats the actuarial table as the risk. i.e., the risk of using the wrong actual table for predicting the frequency of property catastrophes . Securities similar to those suggested in 1992 are now traded on both the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) under the name _ "CAT" (catastrophe) futures as well as in private sales. A CAT future entitles the reinsurer to an agreed dollar amount that increases as the frequency of catastrophe claims in a given region increases. Since the value of CAT contracts rises as losses increase, reinsurers decrease their exposures by buying such instruments . On the other side of the equation, speculators can trade CAT contracts to make a profit, in effect providing them with a means of betting on the weather.
The Mutual Reinsurance Portfolio
In addition to the protection provided by catastrophe futures if catastrophe frequency rises, reinsurers also require additional protection if the severity of catastrophes exceeds their predictions. This, in turn, is afforded by the second part of a catastrophe bundle : a mutual reinsurance portfolio. The mutual reinsurance portfolio provides shares in a CAT pool and is designed to cover deviations from the average severity exposure posed by catastrophes . This combination of catastrophe futures and a mutual reinsurance portfolio can be meshed to provide reinsurers with a very effective means of hedging property catastrophe risks, ultimately producing an optimal allocation of risk bearing between reinsurers seeking to hedge their risks, and speculators who seek a profit from the transaction . The mathematical formulas required to implement a catastrophe bundle can be provided by consultants at the Program on Information and Resources at Columbia University and are customized according to each reinsuress individual situation . Although other hedging instruments are possible, catastrophe bundles are straightforward and relatively easy to execute and trade.
Negative Correlations
In contrast to insurance, catastrophe bundles are not based solely on either the law of large numbers or on the pooling of risk. Rather, they involve the use of negative correlations (in the case of catastrophe futures), together with risk pooling (as respects the mutual reinsurance portfolio). The principle of negative correlations is one with which the securities industry is familiar but the insurance industry is not . For example, when there is an earthquake, those who are affected are affected differently. The homeowner loses from the earthquake but the construction industry gains . Thus, by buying enough shares in the construction industry, one can hedge the risk of losing one's home. The point is that it does not matter who suffers the risk. Everyone does. There is no risk pooling when using negative correlations . Rather, negative correlations allow reinsurers to hedge risks by buying catastrophe futures .
Catastrophe-Linked Bonds
Banfield Ellinger, a London-based reinsurance broker, has recently pioneered a product simi- Solving the problem of hedging unknown catastrophic risks requires a blend of skills from the securities and insurance industries. By tapping capital markets, reinsurers will be better able to deal with correlated, catastrophic risks. The size of the derivative securities markets is a great plus: with about $3 billion traded per day, this market avoids the major difficulty of "thin" markets in which prices turn against the reinsurer after a catastrophe, precisely when capital is needed most. Because the derivatives market is both large and liquid, when a number of reinsurers go to the market to borrow after a catastrophe, it will not turn against them, thus affording reinsurers a source of funds even when demand is high. would flesh out solutions to these problems using the new instruments proposed .here.
In practical terms, what is required to successfully hedge property catastrophe risks is the skill to produce and sell a simple product which is transparent, credible, and can be priced fairly and traded easily. Experience has shown that this can be achieved .
From the insurance industry's point of view, management must ensure that the culture of its firm encourages the innovation needed to hedge these risks. The future of the industry lies with those firms which implement such innovation. The companies that adapt successfully will be the ones that survive. In 10 years, these organizations will draw the map of a completely restructured reinsurance industry.
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Although the article focuses upon Texas, the concepts it discusses also have broader, national ramifications. Many of the reforms implemented in Texas during the early 1990s were adopted in other jurisdictions, as well. Such reforms are likely to be adopted in virtually all states by the end of the decade.
Reforming the Texas Workers Compensation System
At a seminar more than a decade ago in 1985, Self-Insurance Resource, Inc., forecasted the inevitable implosion of the Texas workers compensation system by 1990. The chart in Figure 1 at that time graphically demoncontinued on page 8 ad that the system, as was then constituted, could not withstand the onslaught of trial attorneys -and a workforce that joined forces to willingly exploit the benefits available in an uncontested hog trough.
Amazingly, in investigation after investigation, legislators refused to heed horror stories presented by Texas employers who witnessed firsthand their premium dollars being squandered by a system that fostered no accountability on the part of key players in that system. It was only after the Workers' Compensation Assigned Risk Pool sustained a billion-dollar shortfall and untold billions of premium dollars were wasted that the Texas Senate finally passed meaningful reform legislation.
Rarely has a process yielded such a significant outcome as the 1988-1990 review and legislative overhaul of workers compensation in Texas. By January 1, 1991, the new law 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 was in place. It dealt with all aspects of the system, including the following .
" Governance " Claims handling " Administration " Insurance market " Safety " State assigned " Benefits
Governance
The governance of the system was totally revamped with the creation of the Texas Workers Compensation Commission. This body has taken a much more active role than what was provided under the previous system. Specifically, the Legislative Oversight Committee and the Sunset Process have focused attention on the need to prevent workers compensation from threatening the livelihood of the Texas populace . These two bodies are charged with reviewing, monitoring, and determining the effectiveness of the system components.
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